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MAU HAUS OF THE MIND:
MAKING MAU MAU AND REMAKING KENYA1
BY JOHN LON3DALE
Why was riau hau be l ieved to be so e v i l ? " The hor ro r s t o r y of
B r i t a i n ' s empire i n the 1950s, i t was less of a m i l i t a r y t h r e a t but thought
t o be more a t roc ious than e i t h e r the Malayan Communists or the Cypr io t
EOKA. The movement has l i v e d i n B r i t i s h memories as a symbol of A f r i c a n
savagery, and modern Kenyans are d i v i ded by i t s images, m i l i t a n t
na t iona l i sm or chauv in is t thuggery. This essay explores some of these hau
Maus of the mind.
War and freedom
The c o l o n i a l government f i r s t knew o f t h e movement i n 1948, w i t h t h e
renewa l o f u n r e s t among w h i t e s e t t l e r s ' ' K i k u y u l a b o u r t e n a n t s o r s q u a t t e r s .
250 , 000 o f t h e s e l i v e d on t h e ' W h i t e H i g h l a n d s ' , a q u a r t e r o f t h e K i k u y u
p e o p l e and h a l f t h e fa rm l a b o u r f o r c e . Mau Mau was banned i n 1950. I n
1952 v i o l e n c e f l a r e d on t h e f a r m s , where r e s t r a i n t s on s q u a t t e r c u l t i v a t i o n
and g r a z i n g r i g h t s were more s t e r n l y e n f o r c e d i n t h e i n t e r e s t o f f a r m
c a p i t a l and r e s i s t e d i n t h e cause o f p e a s a n t c l i e n t a g e ; ^ i n t h e s lums o f
N a i r o b i where c r i m e o f f e r e d more t h a n emp loyment ; and i n t h e K i k u y u r e s e r v e
where Mau Man's o p p o n e n t s , ' t h e r e s i s t a n c e " as w h i t e s f i r s t c a l l e d t h e m ,
were k i l l e d , o f t e n by f i r e and w i t h t h e i r k i n ' s a s s e n t , a f o r m o f e x e c u t i o n
once r e s e r v e d f o r s o r c e r e r s . A new g o v e r n o r , S i r E v e l y n B a r i n g , d e c l a r e d
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been insuff iciently recognised. All the contemporary evidence has to be
read with these inner tensions in mind. The white conventional wisdoms of
the day glossed over them, skimming with care the f ragi le surface of racial
solidarity. They only begin to address the question of ev i l . But one has
to start with them before one can follow the divisions, white and black,
which lead one down to the roots of social dread.
Conventional wisdom and private doubt
What then did whites at the time say publicly about the fiau h'au evil?
Many thought i t uniquely depraved, even in the d i r ty annals of modern
terror and partisan war. There were three parts to the conventional
answer, i ts leader's treachery, the bestial i ty of i t s recruitment r i tuals,
and i ts savage methods of k i l l i ng . Kenyatta, who had enjoyed the best of
British c iv i l isat ion, including a course at the London School of Economics
(LSE) and the love of an English wife, was the most l ike ly ar t i f icer of the
oaths. Brit ish propaganda found i t easy to present these as utterly
debased and, by intention, debasing. Mau Mau oaths produced Mau Mau
methods of murder. Like most conventional answers they t e l l us more about
the interpreter than the matter which is being 'explained'. I t w i l l be
convenient to take the murder and magic f i r s t , leaving the making of Mau
Mau's manager t i l l later.
In a big book twice reprinted, which probably introduced more western
readers to modern Africa than any other, the American journalist John
Gunther remarked that Mau Mau ki l l ings were, 'as everybody knows,
peculiarly atrocious.' Victims might be "sliced to pieces or chopped to
b i t s ' , partly to get every gang member to share the gu i l t , for security ,
reasons. As further insurance, a corpse's eyes might be removed to prevent
i t seeing i ts k i l le rs . Kikuyu, after a l l , were 'profoundly superstitious
people. But perhaps some journalists were too profoundly respectful of
what 'everybody knows*. Another distinguished reporter, Graham Greene,
thought that a Bren gun wounded as savagely as a panga> the heavy farm
knife used by Mau Mau, as the British showed by exposing guerri l la
corpses. There was also scandal over the army's habit of severing the
hands of Mau Mau ki l led in the forests, to save the labour of carrying
entire bodies down for identification by finger pr in t . The only
systematic survey of Mau Mau victims suggests that chopping up on the other
side was in fact rare. Dr Wilkinson examined 210 dead. Yes, many had
multiple wounds. But these were generally superf ic ia l . The fatal ones
were commonly six blows to the head, almost as i f insurgents had been
trained to k i l l in this way, to ensure 'a quick and certain death for their
victims. >2A
Total casualty figures also suggest a picture different to Gunther's.
The disparity in death is str iking. On o f f i c i a l data, Mau Mau (or Africans
deemed to be such) lost 12, 590 dead in action or by hanging over the four
most active years of war; 164 troops or police were k i l led in the same
period, most of them Africans. Mau Mau k i l led 1, 880 c iv i l ians, nearly a
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within invented ethnic nationalisms than in a s t i l l more imaginary 'Kenya*.
After 194 5 these border issues became ever more complex in the
spheres of po l i t i cs , labour and land. The segmentary domains of po l i t i ca l
control were subject to trespass, as competing economic interests sought
access to the centre, Nairobi. Here, the watchword of cooptation was
'mult iracial ism'; The f i rs t African was nominated to the legislature in
1944: Eliud Mathu, witchdoctor's son and Bal l iol man. But the pol i t ics of
control s t i l l rested in the segregated reserves and the growing powers of
African local governments. At both levels there were unstable
contradictions. Settler obduracy denied Mathu's moderate supporters, the
Kenya African Union (KAU), any success and thus a l l authority. And while
the governor, Sir Philip Mitchell, declared his fa i th in education as an
aristocratic bridge of culture between the races, he also derided any
plea that African nationalism might play a welcome, creative role in
clearing up the confusions of communal identity. In the reserves,
of f ic ia ls promoted progress but distrusted i ts twin foundations, peasant
cultivators who exhausted the soi l and 'progressives' not in chiefs'
uniform, the egotists and agitators. In the deeper pol i t ics of work, the
labour department struggled to open gateways of industrial negotiation
through the emerging fences of class, against the opposition of both
capital ists and workers, neither of whom saw themselves in such exclusive
terms. Farmers refused, and urban employers were reluctant, to recognise
trades unions; most workers preferred general to craft organisations.
White paternalists and anonymous black townsmen were the material of
confl ict rather than control. ^ The deepest pol i t ics of a l l opposed labour
and land on the 'White Highlands', bringing settlers and Kikuyu face to
face. Most of the white area had formerly been grazed by the Maasai;
scarcely more than one per cent of i t — but the richest part — had been
Kikuyu land. The settlers claimed sole right to the land, by virtue of
treaty, investment and achievement; i t was their one sure footing in
uncertain times. Their Kikuyu squatters claimed at least a share; they had
given two generations of labour to taming the land; and had made i t
r i tual ly home by in i t ia t ing their young and burying their dead on white
farms . Here was a thicket of cross-cutting boundaries indeed. White
farmers no longer wanted a tenantry yet refused them the government's
solution, off-farm villages and the higher wages which would have allowed
squatters to become free labour. Kikuyu squatters had in any case no wish
to become mere labour, and reinforced their determination to remain tenants
by cal l ing in the resources of t r ibe. The confl ict between sett ler and
squatter, capital and labour, class and t r ibe, was the most b i t ter ly
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and cultural conformity of tribes aid not aamit of any other than a
sorcerous explanation tor the cunning ana internecine ferocity of fiau Mau.
Jo deconstruct the confusing evils of Hau Mau is therefore to
reconstruct historical boundaries of morally valid knowledge and power. ' To
summarise the rest of the argument, it is to discover not that Mau hau was
an invented myth, as the British left thought, an alibi for suppressing
legitimate African nationalism, but a dreadful reality, the more awful for
presenting a twisted mirror of the right relations between social groups
which ought to order a colonial situation. These relations were in any
case in disarray, caught between the myth of what had been and the mirage
of what they might become. In the diverse Hau Maus of the European mind
whites were.negotiating fresh stereotypes, to bring new order out of
confusion. In the complex postwar Kenya, Hau hau was bound to be made in
different ways. Two ideas competed to control the conduct of war, with
different border trespass in mind. Race was the most obvious boundary
under threat. Kenya was the first settler colony in British Africa in
which African nationalism challenged that continued dominance of the white
minority which had hitherto been the premise of power. The conservative
reaction was to call a halt to the liberal promises which had stirred up
primitive envy. But if that had been Mau Mau's only border outrage, it
could never have been resisted with such cost and brutality in a just war
by the decolonising Empire of the 1950s. After all, Kwame Nkrumah was
already the Queen's chief minister in the Gold Coast. The compelling
construction of Mau Mau, which won the whites the right to fight the war,
was more subtle and of wider application. In this the border unrest was in
the African soul, on the psychic frontier between tradition and modernity,
community and society, past tribe and future nation. Racial repression
might sharpen the conflict, but was not its cause. This lay in cultural
transition. Mau Mau had to be suppressed, of course. But while diehards
fought to keep the Kikuyu on the far bank of the river of transition — The
river between as Ngugi the Kikuyu novelist had it — white liberals knew
that it had to be crossed. Peace would come only when Kikuyu society was
on the modern side. The need for allies to fight the war, local Africans
and the home government, nerved the liberal imagination as never before to
translate this conventional wisdom into government action.
This liberal construction of the issue did not, however, win the
peace. Still less did its Christian subtext of spiritual rehabilitation.
Qualified measures of modernity, education and loyalty, were indeed used to
ration out the franchise for the first African general elections to
Legislative Council in 1957. Such selection was a precondition for a
colour-blind common roll of electors at some later date, in which white
'standards' would be safe. But this making of the future had no future.
It was blocked by the refusal of African parliamentarians to cooperate and
then killed by the deaths of eleven Mau Mau detainees at Hola camp in early
1959. At the Lancaster House conference in I960, the modernizing mission
gave way to political bargaining. The ideas which cleared the way for, and
then controlled, this longer future, were held by those who fought the war
and were bound to outlast it, the British army and members of Kikuyu
agrarian society. Generals were part of the British establishment;
Conservative politicians, their civil counterparts, finally accepted the
army's view of the war. Mau Mau fighters, on the other hand, were not
privy to Kikuyu authority; they called themselves its itungati, its warrior
servants. Their seniors were none too grateful for their service but
enjoyed its rewards.
Oeceiber 1952, 'The African point of vie/.
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against the bush; water glinted in their dams; windbreaks marched straight
over the horizon; lawns were greener than any 'at home1. Farms also
satisfied. They supported not just a white family but dozens of black ones
too. Only the ignorant or malevolent could talk of 'stolen lands'. Most
of the Highlands had been waste.fully grazed by a few Maasai in the past;
even a Fabian critic said so. J So the African farm families were
immigrant strangers too, other than on the coffee estates of Kiambu. To
employ resident farmworkers was to bestow privilege. Colonial rule had
brought peace, health and rising population; some settlers added to these
general benefits the paternal care of black communities who owed them the
reciprocal duty of loyal service. But that was the problem; farms also
unsettled. Squatters were not a dependent class, tied by a moral community
of protection and service. They were a fifth column, a menace. They
created their own communities in hidden corners of white estates. They
reintroduced the African bush. Nobody knew how many there were. Part of
white domestic life and yet unknowable, the sullenness of race undid the
duty of class. Worse still, after the war farms beg3n to accuse. Farm
districts enacted new local council rules which restricted squatter rights
to cultivation and pasture, and required more labour. Settlers squeezed
the livelihood of their dependants partly because wartime profits enabled
them at last to farm intensively, using more capital than labour. But the
consolidation of civilisation was more important. The Highland achievement
must become unequivocally white, and farmworkers' claims be met with a wage
alone, not land. Squatters resisted the new contracts, muttering among
themselves of settler 'sin' and 'hypocrisy'. Even white officials used the
language of 'moral entitlement' on behalf of labour. Many settlers
refused or failed to curtail their squatters' rights. Nevertheless, the
growing squatter resistance had to be deprived of moral advantage. Some
settlers regained the moral ground by infantilising their workers. One
district council urged that 'the African' was 'still a savage and a child',
who responded to 'firmness' with a new 'respect' for whites who removed his
freedoms. It is difficult not to conclude that white guilt was assuaged
by racial contempt. Africans ought not to make their masters behave so
badly.
Most whites experienced Hau Mau as the squatter armed. The frontline
was at home, between supper and bedtime. Tools became weapons. The man
who wore one's cast-off trilby was fingering his panga. Mau Mau was an
ungrateful stab in the back, *a revolt of the domestic staff... It was as
though Jeeves had taken to the jungle'. Two of the first settlers
murdered were doctors, known for giving free treatment to squatter
families; the six year-old son of one of them was also killed; the press
pictured his bloodstained bed, with chamber pot and clockwork train-set on
the floor. And what must, alas, be the best known account of hau Mau,
Ruark's oft-reprinted novel Something of Value, centres on the friendship
between the settler's son Peter and the squatter's son Kimani. Kimani grew
up in Nairobi's slums to become Mau Mau. Friend was now beast. In a
blood-curdling book, the most chilling sentence for its settler readers
must have been Ruark's statement of Kimani's purpose when he left the
forest, gun in hand and murder in mind: 'This time Kimani was going
63. Kingsley Martin, 'Kie set t ler case', Hen statesman, 29 Hoveober, 1952.
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determined not to fight a racial war. In the empire of 1952 that was in
any case impossible.
Liberals and transitionals
Conservative settlers made themselves plain. Liberals dissembled.
This was partly because ignorance and panic made them share conservative
views. I t was also to preserve a united front. On his f i r s t v i s i t to
Nairobi, Lyttelton, colonial secretary, maintained that Mau Mau was not the
child of economic pressure. That was to calm the set t lers; he himself
knew better than that. Two months earlier his of f ic ia ls had considered
reforms which might answer 'any legitimate grievance of law-abiding
Africans' and raised them with Baring before he flew to Kenya. They had
discussed housing improvements, c i v i l service promotion, crop prices, even
the question of African farming on the White Highlands. Baring called
reform his 'second prong', to make his f i r s t , repression, look presentable.
I t was also an essential tactic of war. The Kenya government must stop
driving moderate Africans into the arms of the extremists and, instead,
sp l i t the KAU. Baring might well have to decide 'either to "bust" or "buy"
Kenyatta.' Events precluded that. But London had to buy the sett lers,
or they might bust the government. Some of them howled 'appeasement' when
Baring revealed the second prong. I f he was to keep the sett lers at heel
he would have to mind his tongue. Off icial statements on Mau Mau toed
the conservative l ine.
Off ic ia l action was different, and action remade Mau Mau in enough
of f i c ia l minds. Government policy steered between two complementary aims.
First, no increase in ruling influence must be allowed to the sett lers; the
precedents of two world wars were not encouraging in that respect. Nor
must they be stampeded into a ferment which could be quietened only by
concession. Yet the state had to respond to African grievance, despite
some whites' fears of betrayal. For the second need was to prevent Mau Mau
* infecting' other African peoples; there was anxious evidence that i t
might. Brutal repression of their fellows was s t i r r ing angry passions.
The deputy head of: the colonial off ice, Sir Charles Jef f r ies, squared the
circle with some dog-eared o f f i c ia l wisdom. 'The only sound l i n e ' , he
believed, was to 'build up a substantial "middle class" of all races to be
the backbone of the country.'83 He did not know how i t should be done;
nobody did, but i t was by now the standard magical spell for conjuring new
order out of colonial confusion. Racial barriers must melt into class
coalit ions. Meanwhile a war had to be fought and i t s methods were hardly
middle class. Yet most of Kenya was at peace and must so remain. African
rural ambitions must be sat i f ied, urban discontents relieved and, more
78. Ly t t e l t on , radio broadcast froa Na i rob i , 4 Noveibar 1952 ( t ransc r ip t i n UNA, CO.5/173); and repeated
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cohesion in their souls (he could scarcely have been more wrong on both
counts) unusually ill-adapted to the transition. It is less well realised
that, in its later pages, his report was also a charter for deliberate
modernisation. hau Hau had exploited the insecurities of transitional man;
Africans must be given the reassurance of modernity. The confusion of
categories must cease, especially within the family, where traditional
woman could not oe companion to modern man. New boundaries or order must
be drawn. Again, this was the ooinion of practical men. Askwith believed
that recovery from Mau Mau was secure only in the context of regular
employment and family life. Other senior officials had long come to a
similar conclusion as the remedy for wider ills.
In the post-war era, it was generally agreed in British colonial
Africa that both peasant economy and unskilled urban labour were no longer
able to sustain social order, let alone provide the basis for development
and improved welfare. Neither sector of African life was complete in
itself, each was debilitated by what connected them, the steady oscillation
of male wage labour. As Car-others Pitted Mau Mau into his concept of the
transition, so many officials did the same. Their transitional man was
flesh and blood in the migrant worker. Mau Mau had travelled home with him
from work. The cesspit of the slum had infected the countryside with the
incessant movement between them. Two government plans and unprecedented
sums of public finance were now devoted to separating them. The Carpenter
Committee proposed radical improvements in urban African wages and
conditions so as to create a new basis for society, the urban African
family, where before Nairobi had accommodated loose atoms, labour units,
bachelor workers. For the countryside the deputy director of
agriculture, Roger Swynnerton, proposed a freehold revolution in land
tenure to produce the rural mirror image, the peasant family able to earn a
rapidly increasing income on its own land by its own labour, neither
subsidising its bachelor sons in town nor yet needing their monthly
remittances. The conflicting bundles of rights which characterised
customary land tenure, the fragmentation of plots, the continual drain of
litigation, would all be swept aside with registration, consolidation,
fencing, contour-ploughing and tree-crops. Disorder would give way to
cadastral survey and straight lines. Each government department, Labour
and Agriculture, seized the opportunity created by Mau Mau to argue, with a
conviction which almost two decades of frustrated persuasion had sharpened,
that the risks of pushing African tribal communities through the transition
to market society were as nothing to leaving them hanging betwixt and
between. Each talked openly in the language of class as the basis of order
and power. If Mau Mau was a disorder of the beginnings of progress the
only cure was to bring progress to a successful end.
Missionaries had their own ideas of what that progress had been and
should be. At the outset of the emergency both the 'established' mission
societies, the Anglican Church Missionary Society and the Church of
Scotland Mission, associated themselves publicly with the multi-racial aim
of the late governor, Mitchell, to 'evolve from components at present
heterogeneous, a harmonious and organic society. But they had a private
90. Carothers, Psychology, 22-4.
91. The best suasary statement of the district coaiissioner's view is in Margery Pirhaa, 'Struggle against
Mau Mau II: Seeking the causes and the remedies', the tiies (London), 23 April 1953; while reprinted in her
Colonial sequence 1949 to 1969 (London, 1970), 112-15, it has been given the disastrously wrong date of
1955.
92. CPK, Report of the cottittee on African nsges (Nairobi, 1954).
93. CPK, A phn to intensify the develop$ent of African agriculture in Kenya (Nairobi, 1954).
94. For Mitchell's statement, see Church Missionary Society [CMS], Hau Hau, »ha{ is it? (London, 1952), 8;
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had a role only as part of a p o l i t i c a l response to the whole range of
Kenya's problems. Moreover, the churches had a par t icu lar d i s a b i l i t y which
must be honestly faced. This was the nature of Revival in Kenya. Hi therto
i t had produced Christ ian men and women 30 convinced of the power of Christ
that, while often martyrs to Mau Mau, they also refused to take up arms,
against i t . The d i s t r i c t administrat ion was suspicious of t he i r pacif ism
and often refused them the ' l oya l t y c e r t i f i c a t e s ' which would have allowed
them freedom of movement. Conversely the churches despaired of using
such s p i r i t u a l conviction in social ac t ion. Chr is t ian i ty could only work
i ts miracles of reconci l ia t ion once the p o l i t i c a l and economic jus t i ce had
been created by other means. That, too, was conventional Chr is t ian
wisdom.
Such bel iefs ana actions helped men in authority to f i gh t the war of
t rans i t i on with a clear conscience, and to bring to just ice some at least
of t he i r subordinates who fougnt a d i f f e ren t , d i r t y , rac ia l war. But i t is
not at a l l certain that t h i s construct ion of Mau Mau provided a foundation
for the peace. Two men at the centre of th i s bid for l i be ra l author i ty
warned e x p l i c i t l y that i t would not. The forgotten part of Carothers'
report on Hau Mau's psychology warned that i t was f u t i l e to t r y to remake
the Kikuyu in the ind iv idua l i s t English image unless they were given the
chance t o exercise respons ib i l i t y , which meant power. Rehabi l i ta t ion would
be complete only with democracy. Tom Askwith, in charge of the
detention camps, conducted rehab i l i t a t i on on the same assumption. The f i r s t
was only an adviser, the second was sacked fo r not forc ing the Pace, when
in 1957 the African elections demanded altogether more urgency. The
views of the army were quite a d i f f e ren t matter.
Soldiers and Po l i t i cs
The army also fought against Mau Mau's mi l i ta ry confusions. These
were qui te d i f fe rent from those which haunted the l i be ra l myth of
modernisation. General Erskine, commander during the c r i t i c a l f i r s t part
of the war, took a simple so ld ie r l y view of the oaths which so disturbed
the understanding of most observers. He recognised that Mau Mau had
grievances and an aim, to e ject Europeans. The connexion between s t ra teg ic
end and nauseating means was en t i re l y ra t i ona l , as he explained with cr isp
economy. 'Secrecy was necessary, hence oaths were administered. Money was
necessary, hence the oath had to be paid f o r . The whole t r i be had to act
as one, hence oaths were administered fo rc ib l y . Discipl ine was necessary,
hence judges and stranglers became part of the organisat ion. I t was
per fect ly clear from the nature of the oaths that violence was intended.
Oaths became more and more binding and best ia l . '105 Cooling the mind the
better to know the enemy was carr ied s t i l l fur ther by the so ld ier who had
the best Mau Mau war and la te r became a theor is t of s im i la r 'low in tens i ty
operat ions ' , the then Captain Kitson. He found the rac ia l myth of Mau Mau
bad fo r t ac t i ca l in te l l igence. 'Looked at over one's shoulder the oath was
a f r i g h t f u l business, suffused in e v i l . ' I f one looked at i t s t r a i gh t ,
what was le f t? 'A cat hung on a s t i c k ; poor pussy. An arch of thorns with
101. The one notable exception to Christian pacifiso was shown by the independent Africa Christian Church
in Hurang'a, whose headquarters at Xinyona was so bellicose that Mau Mau fighters christened it '8eMin':
'A book of forest history1 recovered by tfillougby Toopson in Decewnber 1953: RH.liss.Afr.s. 1534.
102. As i n a l l other aspects of th i s essay, there is a such deeper h is to ry to be t o l d ; the ana lys is here
is der ived p r i n c i p a l l y f ros a paper by S.A. Morr ison, 'What does r e h a b i l i t a t i o n mean', 5 June 1954, seen by
courtesy of Greet Kersha* «ho *as eoployed by the CCK i n the 1950s.
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the oath turned men in to beasts, and that Mau Mau lacked ra t i ona l
object ives. Even Kenyan-born white po l ice came to accept these
subversive t ruths and found that hau Mau commanded t h e i r respect. After 68
hours of in ter rogat ing the captured 'General China*. Superintendent Ian
Henderson, the Doys * own hero of r.he s e t t l e r s ' war, concluded that his .
prisoner was indeed 'a complete fana t i c " . Was he then mentally i l l ? Not
at a l l . Henderson found that China had 'a good brain and a remarkable
memory.' And he knew why he was f i g h t i n g . 'At the xime of his
in ter rogat ion , his sole wish was to expound his p o l i t i c a l testament before
Legis lat ive Council and then walk to the gallows without t r i a l . When
he too was la te r captured, China's successor in Mount Kenya's fo res ts ,
General Kaleba, out l ined that 'u l t imate p o l i t i c a l o b j e c t i v e ' as 'the
achievement of more land and power of se l f -de te rmina t ion . They do not
consider th i s w i l l be achieved by violence alone, but they f i rm ly believe
that these who are sympathetic to the i r cause can only succeed i f Mau Mau
continue to f i g h t . ' The opposing generals understood each other. Each
acknowledged t h e i r l im i ta t i ons in a p o l i t i c a l war. They could only exert
the m i l i t a r y pressure needed to force a p o l i t i c a l peace.
But i t took the tragedy of Hola camp, i n which eleven 'hard core '
detainees were beaten to death in the name of modernisation, t o br ing the
Br i t i sh government round to the mi l i t a ry view. As Margery Perham put i t ,
'hard core ' defiance was moved by t he i r determination t o prove that they
'were not i n the gr ip of some remedial obsession but pursuing log ica l and
irrevocable p o l i t i c a l aims. The detainees would have put i t rather
d i f f e r e n t l y . The immediate issue was work and i t s r e f u s a l . Their case was
simple. They were p o l i t i c a l pr isoners, not c r im ina ls . To work t o order
would be to admit t o wrong. Work was a proper demonstration of
respons ib i l i t y f o r the free man; under any other cond i t ion i t was
s l a v e r y . l i a The co lon ia l government did not agree, but tha t was no longer
relevant. The l i b e r a l campaign fo r westernisat ion, as both the bridge of
t r ans i t i on and condi t ion of p o l i t i c a l r ights on a q u a l i f i e d f ranchise, had
been superceded as an organising p r i o r i t y . P o l i t i c a l change could no
longer wait on repentance and the development of a p o l i t i c a l l y responsible
(that i s , gu i l t -conscious) middle class. B r i t a i n could not continue to
pursue the remaking of Kenya by force at a time when other co lon ia l powers,
France and Belgium, were abandoning attempts t o remodel co lon ia l ru le f o r
the moral high ground of informal empire. A p o l i t i c a l war had to be
ended by p o l i t i c a l means. C i v i l i sa t i on had t o be gambled on concession and
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p o l i t i c a l change was fought between the men of au tho r i t y l i k e Kenyatta on
the one hand, wno was the son-in-law of net one but two o f f i c i a l ch ie fs
and, on the o tner , the dispossessed and lecal minors. The reputable, i t
began to appear, could not win power except at the appal l ing pr ice of owing
i t s achievement to men they despised. These l a t t e r , the hard men of
Nai rob i , too!*" over the oath of respectable uni ty which Kenyatta knew, and
pressed i t , by fo rce , deception and persuasion on those who hoped that
desperate deeds, ngero, would earn them what they needed, the adulthood
which e n t i t l e d them to share the f r u i t s of v i c t o r y . These were the men and
women whom Kikuyu knew as fiau hau, not a l l those many who had taken the
oath of un i ty but the few who had taken the second, f i g h t i n g oath. But
then, however much Kikuyu may have denounced Mau Mau w i t h i n , few were so
careless of communal s o l i d a r i t y or t h e i r own l i ves that they betrayed i t
wi thout. Most Europeans mistook th i s fear and s o l i d a r i t y f o r t r i b a l u n i t y ,
a mystic f o rce . I t was t h i s myth of t r i b a l un i ty which found Kenyatta
g u i l t y . He was the Kikuyu leader; he had to be responsible fo r everyth ing
done in his name.
Throughout his p o l i t i c a l career, with unswerving consistency over
f i f t y years, Kenyatta taught that au thor i t y was earned by the s e l f -
d i s c i p l i n e of labour, as he had learned from his grandparents. In 1928 he
had warned of the fa te of native Aust ra l ians, whom the B r i t i s h ' found were
decreasing by reason of t h e i r s l o t h . . . and so they got pushed t o the bad
parts of the land ' " The Kikuyu ought, rather , t o fo l low the example of the
Haoris. The B r i t i s h had found them *to be a very d i l i g e n t people. And now
they are permit ted to se lect four men t o represent them in the Big
C o u n c i l . . . ' ' In t h i s simple contrast was summed up a l l h is l a t e r
p o l i t i c a l thought. On numerous occasions between his return from England
i n 1946 and h is a r res t i n 1952 Kenyatta pub l i c l y denounced those who no
longer worked t h e i r land, as the enemies of p o l i t i c a l advance: ' i f we use
our hands we s h a l l be men; i f we don' t we s h a l l be wor th less . ' Among the
vast crowds who l i s tened , those who no longer had land did not thank him
for t h i s sermon.
So Kenyatta, too , made a meaning f o r Mau Mau. In f r on t of a huge
crowd a t Nyeri i n July 1952 he compared Mau Mau wi th t h e f t and drunkenness.
Henderson, the pol ice observer, thought tha t he was equivocat ing; and the
p rov inc ia l commissioner l a t e r believed t h i s meeting marked a tu rn ing po in t
in the swing of Kikuyu opinion to Mau Mau. But Henderson a lso reported
Kenyatta as saying ' I pray to you that we j o i n hands fo r freedom and
freedom means abol ishing c r i m i n a l i t y . That i s not an obvious po in t f o r
a n a t i o n a l i s t orator t o make, but prec ise ly what one would expect of a
for any Mau Hau class ideology is Kaggia, /foots, but the nearest he cones to that is syndicalist; no Renoir
of Hau Mau initiation suggests that the political education given to recruits contained reference to class
struggle; conversely, an allegedly 'typical notice' of a Hau Mau initiation to counter the pre-esergency
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selling our goods where and when we «ant': Corfield report, 164.
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The agricultural revolution of the war of modernisation had gone on without
them. On emerging from the forests or detention they were landless still,
indeed more so tnan before in a rural world which had now been realigned by
land consolidation and freehold title. They remained debarred from the
creation of order, outside its boundary fence. And on his release back to
political life in 1961 Xenyatta took up hi3 old refrain. His government
would not be hooligan rule; Mau Hau had no moral claim on power. He no
doubt intended to calm white farmers and foreign investors. But he had a
still more anxious audience to reassure, with nowhere else to go. Most
Kenyans, certainly all household heads, were relieved to discover that
Kenyatta was on the side of domestic order, after all. Their traditional
civilising mission has now become a modern ruling ideology. By
criminalising Mau Mau once more in the public mind, as he had tried a
decade earlier, Kenyatta restated his authority to remake the politics of
Kenya.
There are therefore many answers to the question I was asked two
years^ago by a landless taxi-driver. As a schoolboy he had taken General
Matenjagwo — General matted hair — his last bowl of beans before he met
his death in action. His mother had lost her land rights to the senior
wife during land-consolidation. 'Why', he asked in some indignation, 'why
did they call us imaramarft*
SUMMARY
This a r t i c l e explores the imaginative meanings of Mau Mau which white
and black protagonists invented out of t he i r various f e a r f u l ambitions f o r
the future of Kenya. Within the general assumptions of white super io r i t y
and the need to destroy Mau Mau savagery, four mutually incompatible
European myths can be picked out. Conservatives argued that Mau Mau
revealed the la tent ter ror - laden pr imi t iv ism in a l l Af r icans, the Kikuyu
especia l ly . This reversion had been stimulated by the dangerous freedoms
offered by too l i b e r a l a colonial ism in the post-war wor ld. The answer
must be an unapologetic reimposit ion of white power now and a segregated
fu tu re . Liberals blamed Hau Mau upon the bewildering psychological e f fec ts
of rapid soc ia l change and the collapse of order ly t r i b a l values. Afr icans
must be brought more decis ive ly through the period of t r a n s i t i o n from
t r i b a l conformity to competit ive society, to play a f u l l par t in a m u l t i -
rac ia l future dominated by western cu l tu re ; th is would e n t a i l rad ica l
economic reforms. Chr is t ian fundamentalists saw Mau Mau as co l l ec t i ve s i n ,
to be overcome by ind iv idua l confession and conversion. More has been read
in to the i r rehab i l i t a t ing mission in the detention camps than i s warranted,
since they had no theology of power. The whites with decisive power were
the B r i t i sh m i l i t a r y . They saw the emergency as a p o l i t i c a l war which
needed p o l i t i c a l so lu t ions, f o r which repression, soc ia l improvement and
s p i r i t u a l revival were no subs t i t u te . They, and the 'hard-core* Mau Mau
detainees at Hola camp who thought l i ke them, cleared the way fo r the
peace. This was won not by any of the white construct ions of the r i s i n g
but by Kenyatta's Kikuyu p o l i t i c a l thought, which inspi red yet c r imina l ised
Mau Mau.
140. Joio Kenyatta, Suffering nithovt bitterness (Nairobi, 1968), 124, 146, 147, 154, 159, 161, 163-8,
183, 189, 204. My view of Kenyatta's attitude to Mau Hau at this tiie is thus entireiy different to that
proposed by Buijtenhuijs, /fair Hm tuenty yttrs ifter, 49-61, and is supported by the picture facing page 57
in this book, showing ex-Hau Hau in 1971 Kith the slogan 'Nau Hau is sti l l alive: we don't vant revolution
in Kenya.'
